result in a decline in the number of strikes . . ." but "the objective can be obtained without passage of such legislation."* A recent study of strikes by local employees developed explicit hypotheses and submitted the hypotheses to an empirical test. Burton and Krider employed a number of single indicators to perform cross-sectional tests for relationships between union power, relative earning, unemployment rates, taxation levels, state laws, and a number of unpublished measures of strike activity for the years 1968 to 1971." Variables related to the local government environment in the state, for example, private unionization and right-to-work laws, achieved the best predictive power. Burton and Krider's general conclusion, however, was that the incidence of local employee strikes was essentially a random phenomenon. This conclusion receives some support from Hicks's theory of strikes and a subsequent empirical study by S c~l l y .~ Hicks contended that most strikes were the result of inadequate information caused by faulty negotiation.
Burton and Krider's general conclusion about the unpredictability of strikes in local government may, nonetheless, be partly attributable to several weaknesses in their methodology. First, several of the indicators they used were ambiguous measures of the concepts they attempted to measure. They used the ratio of taxes to personal income, for example, as a measure of ability to pay and hypothesized a positive association with strikes. But as Steiber points out in a critique of their analysis: "The authors apparently neglected to consider the greater ability of cities with a higher tax rate to pay higher wages, thus contributing to the negative influence on ~trikes."~ Second, they also neglected to consider the implication of using several measures of strike activity and, therefore, the possible instability of the coefficients of some variables across regression equations. Third, because the set of independent variables Burton and Krider utilized were highly intercorrelated, they introduced a strong possibility of interaction error into their regression equations. When they computed rrgressions for strike frequency and size using only four variables, their regression equations were relatively stable across the four years they studied and the F-ratios for the equations were generally significant. Burton and Krider's conclusion about the unpredictability of local government strikes, however, appeared to be more strongly influenced by the regressions derived from the full set of highly intercorrelated independent variables than the reduced models. Finally, Steiber suggests a number of possible strike antecedents, for example, racial disharmony and the diffusion or "bandwagon" effects of teacher strikes, that may have increased the amount of explained variance which Burton and Krider did not consider in their analysis."
Given the paucity of previous research and the general lack of agreement about determinants of local employee strike activity, we set out to test the relationship of some common dimensions of local government labor relations to strike 'Ibid., 'Ibid. While no hypotheses concerning the relationships of these groups of variables to each other are offered in this study, except for our treatment of the legal policy variables, it is likely that they do not represent independent dimensions. It was our objective, however, to separate variables into each of these four groupings to determine the underlying relatedness of the measures and to provide parsimonious description of these dimensions via factor variables.1° From the factor analyses of these groupings, ten factors were derived : urbanization-industrialization, private union influence, race-poverty, local employee status, past strike activity, local reliance, fiscal effort, property tax reliance, professionalism, and facilitation of collective bargaining. The following section briefly discusses the interpretation of each of these factors. The loadings for the factors derived from the macro-environmental variables are presented in Table 1 -A. The first factor is termed urbaniration-industrialization because of the high positive loadings of percent urban population, percent non-agricultural employment, population density, per capita and median family incomes, and the negative loading for percentage of low income population. Three variables related to private sector unionization load on the second factor. Union membership as a percentage of non-agricultural employment and volume of strike activity load positively and the existence of a right-to-work law loads negatively on this factor suggesting the common dimension of private union influence. The final factor derived from the macro-environmental variables is termed racepoverty because of the high positive loading of percentage low income and percentage black. Table I -R exhibits the loadings for the four factors derived from the governmental sector variables. Following Sharkansky and Hofferbert, the factor with high positive loadings for local employees per 10,000 population, per capita tax revenues, the percentages of state and local revenue raised by local governments and expenditures spent by local government, and a negative loading for state employees per 10,000 population is termed local reliance.ll Fiscal effort, representing the general support for public expenditures, exhibits high positive loadings for state employees per 10,000 population, revenues per thousand dollars personal income, expenditures per capita, and expenditures per thousand dollars personal income. The third of the governmental sector factors is property tax reliance, identified by the positive loadings of per capita property tax revenues, percent of real property locally assessed, and property tax revenue as a percentage of expenditures. The final factor derived from the groupings of governmental sector variables is termed professionalism. Because the percentage of the population within city manager cities and the percentage of cities in the state with city manager reforms load positively on this factor, it is interpreted as an indicator of the reformed structure and professional manaqement practices within local governments in the state.
Two factors were derived from the group of public employment variables. Local employee status groups together a number of variables representing the relative quality of local employment. Ratios of local employee earnings to private employee and teacher earnings and the ratio of local employee legal policy to teacher legal policy all load positively on this factor. Three measures of previouc; tvork stoppages by public employees within the state load positively on the second factor, termed past strike activity.
The fourth grouping of variables, legal policy, consists of scores for eleven state policies governing the conduct of collective bargaining in local government. Among the policy provisions are those covering the type of bargaining rights accorded local employees. the scope of bargaining, and the type of strike policy.'? Only one factor was extracted from these eleven variables. This factor is tenned facilitation o f collectiue bargaining because of the positive and high loadings of all eleven variables.
Based on the results of this factor analysis, we generated factor variables using factor score coefficients. This procedure, rather than creating indices only from those variables loaded highly on each factor, assigns differential weighting to all component variables in the factor analysis. This has the advantage of inchding suppression variables in the estimation of the derived index rather than leaving their effects uncontrolled.13
The next part of our research strategy called for the prediction and testing of relationships between the factor variables and measures of strike activity. We distinguish among components of strike activity as suggested by Britt and Ga11e.14 Following Britt and Galle, we utilize four symbols to denote our measures:15 WKRS = the number of non-educational employees in the state's local government sector, October, 1972 WS = the number of work stoppages from strikes, walkouts, and lockouts, 1973 WI = the number of workers involved in work stoppages, 1973 MDI = the number of man-days idle from work stoppages, 1973
Using these measures, four indices of strike activity were defined:16 frequency = WS; relative frequency = WS/WKRS; duration = MDI/WI; and volume = MDI/WKRS. Volume is analogous to Kerr and Siegel's index of strike propensity in that it provides a summary measure of local employee-p~tblic employer conflict.17 However, using strike volume as the sole dependent variable tends to obscure other, possibly significant, information. Since the number of man-days idle is a product of strike frequency, participation, and duration, strike volume might vary due to the independent variation of any one of these factors. The raw frequency is also included as a separate measure because of its possible interest to some observers of local employee strikes. Although frequency is likely to be substantially dependent on size, when the effects of size are controlled its inclusion as a measure of strike activity complements the standardized frequency measure.
A series of hypotheses relating the factor variables to strike activity are presented in this section and the theoretical rationales for relationships are explained. I n addition, the possible influences of several control and moderator variables are also discussed.
Hypothesis 1 : The greater the levels of u~banitation-industrializatior~, Private union influence, and race-poverty, the greater the feuels of strike activity.
Each of these environmental variables have received some attention as potentially significant contributors to the level of strike activity by local government employees. The expected positive relationship between urbanization-industrialization and strike activity is based upon several lines of reasoning. First, Smelser' 
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that urbanization, frequently recognized as a source of societal strain, will be positively related to work stoppage activity.18 Second, several studies indicate that increasing urbanization and industrialization detract from the type of work performed and the environment of the job, decreasing job satisfaction and increasing employee alienation.lg These factors, in turn, have been positively associated with strike a~t i v i t y .~ There appears to be very little consensus about the relationship of union influence to local employee strike activity. Burton and Krider found a weak positive relationship between labor union membership as a percent of the nonagricultural labor force and four strike measure^.^^ Steiber argued in a critique of their study that the level of private unionization has frequently not been translatable into support for public employee organization and, in some cases, "private sector unions regarded public employee unions as threatening satisfactory political deals they had worked out on behalf of their workers."22 On the other hand, Steiber's argument is not incompatible with the importance some attribute to direct public employee affiliation with private sector unions and the role external union attachments play in enhancing local employee militancy.25 Furthermore, it seems reasonable to expect that even if private union influence in a locale is not directly translatable to support for public employee goals, generally favorable public attitudes toward collective action would affect local employee assessments of the political and economic costs of strikiny and potential public reaction to a strike. Because the preponderance of evidence tends to support a positive relationship, and the weak positive relationship between private unionization and strike activity found by Burton and Krider was based on the use of a single indicator, we expect to find a significant positive relationship.
Steiber also argued in his critique of Burton and Krider's study that one of aspects of local employee strikes they ignored was their racial component. Couturier notes that "public employment has throughout history been a tool for societal purposes and usually for upward mobility of those historically 'locked out' of society."24 Several case studies of local government strikes also suq-gest that racial and economic heterogeneity within a community influence the potential for factionalism within local employee orqanizations and influence the potential for conflict between the black community and b~~reancratic For these reasons, we expect race-poverty to be positively associated with local government strike activity.
Hypothesis 2: The greater the status of local government employees, the lower the level of strike activity. Economists, sociologists, and psychologists have developed a number of concepts associated with individual and group status relevant to the analysis of local employee strike activity. Usually economists incorporate some form of relative earnings measure as a predictor of strike activity.* The concepts relative deprivation and distributive justice have been used to denote the discrepancy between the actual position of an actor with respect to some value dimension and the nonnative expectations of the actor with respect to the d i m e n s i~n .~~ Theories of social stratification have also been frequently employed to explain employer-employee conflict.= The derived concept, local employee status, reflects the underlying rationale of these other concepts -the position of local employees vis-a-vis relevant value dimensions. The gap between status and expectations should narrow with increasingly favorable relative wages, increasingly favorable public policy treatment vis-a-vis teachers, and increasing demand for public employees. The likelihood of non-conflictual settlement of labor-management disagreements should increase as status increases and thus we expect strike activity to decrease.
Hypothesis 3: The greater the level of past strike activity, the greater the predisposition to engage in strikes, and thus the greater the current level of strike activity.
The theoretical rationale for this hypothesis, drawn from Gurrys analysis of civil strife, is "that populations in which strife is chronic tend to develop, by an interaction process, a set of beliefs justifying violent responses" to perceived blockages of their goals achievement." For example, Steiber suggests: "It is probable that in many cities other employees have voted to strike after observing the militancy of teachers and the results of strikes by teacher unions."80 This type of interaction effect may also develop over time within particular local employee groups. Evidence from industrial experience suggests that the strike, as an institutional practice, becomes part of the routinized means of interaction between union and management.s1 Thus, for example, the interaction in contract negotiations between the New York City Transit Authority and the Transport Workers Union has been identified to follow a "script" because of the almost ritual use of strike threats and routinized interaction patterns during periods of contract negotiation^?^ It is also probable that this variable taps variations in local government strikes that are attributable to interstate differences in the tolerance of political system members for conflict.
Hypothesis 4: The greater the reliance on local government in a state's political system, the greater the level of local employee strike activity.
Local reliance denotes a number of attributes of local government which may be relevant to understanding strike behavior, including the scope of local govern- ment services, the general character of state-local interaction and interdependence, and the value the public places on local government within a state's political system.as The scope of local government may influence factors such as the extent of intergroup competition and the manageability of local labor relations which, in turn, contribute to the incidence of local employee strikes. The value the public places on local government within a state's political system is likely to provide an advantage to local employees in strategic interaction since the weight of public opinion and attitudes about the essentiality and continuity of public services influences employee decisions about the costs of striking. If this strategic advantage is exploited we might expect a greater incidence of strikes. I t is also possible that reliance on local revenues would indicate less governmental flexibility to finance increases in employee benefits and the costs of collective bargaining agreements and also contribute to higher levels of strike activity.
Hypothesis 5: T h e greater the fiscal effort within a state's political system, the lower the level of strike activity.
The concepts of "fiscal capacity," "fiscal effort," and "environmental munificence" are synonymous terms representing a particular political unit's willingness to incur additional taxes for the provision of public services. Fiscal effort includes both local and state level revenues. The additional revenue provided to local governments on a regular basis through state sales or income takes or "one-time" bail-outs are frequently important contributors to closing the local government budgetary gap and avoiding strikes. Burton and Krider found a negative relationship between strikes and the ratio of taxes to personal income, an indicator similar to several of the measures loaded on the fiscal effort factor. Unlike their studv. however, fiscal effort is conceived here as measuring primarily only one side of the ability to pay concept, the relative magnitude of revenues supplied to a local government.s4 We expect that the willingness of the public to support public services and incur higher taxation will be negatively related to strikes.
Hypothesis 6: T h e greater the reliance of local government on property taxation, the greater the level of strike activity.
Another dimension of a local government's ability to pay adequate wages and benefits to local government employees is its flexibility to adjust revenues to increasing costs. Property taxation is a major source of local government revenue and the source to which local government officials must often turn as a last resort to adjust revenue-expenditure imbalances created by negotiated agreements. Access to higher revenues through property taxation is, however, frequently complicated by other policy requirements. Some states either place maximum limits on property tax levels or limits on allowable annual increases.36 Increases in assessments are also often subject to voter approval.86 Those cities that are heavily reliant on property taxes as a source of revenue can be expected to have less flexibility in financing a<qeements and <greater uncertainty surrounding the limits of their ability to pay.S7 Considering the overall impact of these elements, we expect that increasing reliance on property taxation will be positively associated with strike activity.
Hypothesis 7: The more professional local government management, the lower the level of strike activity. The literature on local employee strikes provides differing predictions about the impact of professionalism. On one hand, some authors predict that political chief executives are more likely to resolve conflicts with local employees through political expediency by buying out their votes and thus avoiding strikes.~~ On the other hand, city management reforms are expected to bring a higher level of competence and expertise to city administrati~n.~~ This is important in regard to the argument that a lack of competent staff and cohesive professional leaderhip is res~onsible for much of the turmoil in local mvernment labor relation^.^ Within v the city management profession itself, however, a survey of city managers found no relationship between a measure of professionalism and their attitudes toward organized public employees.'l The most direct assessment of this hypothesis is provided by Frederickson's analysis of role occupancy and attitudes toward labormanagement conflict in g~vernment."~ He found that role occupancy did influence attitudes and concluded that "appointed executives would have to be selected to achieve integrative bargaining, and they would have to be given enough latitude so that they can bargain in good faith. Only then can labor be expected to obey no-strike prohibition^."^^ Although Frederickson's conclusion is highly tentative, we view the evidence supporting a negative relationship between professionalism and strike activity as more plausible than alternative formulations.
Moderator and Control Relationships. Since reliance on bivariate analysis alone for evaluation of the hvpotheses can lead to erroneous conclusions and dro-,.
vides only minimal inferential leverage, we also developed a set of control and moderator variables which might be expected to influence the bivariate relationships. We employed the variables in Table 2 to test for spurious relationships and to judge the moderating influences of other relevant variables. The control variables were used to test for spurious relationships created either by the effects of the underlying sample size on the dependent variable or aggregation error which masked differences in the characteristics of cities in each state. We would expect, for instance. state size to reduce the relationship of the independent variables with the raw frequency of strikes. Three other variables, the number of cities over 10,000 population, the number of SMSA's over 200,000 population, and average city size, were used as checks for aggregation error. Some observers of local government strike activity argue, for example, that strikes occur more frequently in cities over a particular threshold size."' Among the moderator variables in Table 2 we include the facilitation of collective bargaining index derived from our factor analysis. Two previous studies suggest that collective bargaining policy is appropriately conceptualized as a moderator both because of its strong correlation with state environmental variables and the likelihood that it affects the mobilization of labor organization^.^^ Two unemployment variables, percent unemployed and change in the unemployment rate, are utilized to test for possible influences of business cycles on local government strikes. The percent change to urban between 1960 and 1970 was employed to tap the possible influence of population dynamics in contrast to our static measure of urbanization. Finally, some experts argue that the quality of interaction between labor and management in collective bargaining relationships improves over time and thus decreases the likelihood of strikes so we incorporated the number of years since the first comprehensive collective bargaining law was passed to test this moderating relationship.
Three statistical operations were performed to test the individual hypotheses and test the predictive power of the common dimensions represented by the factor variables. G m~l e corklations were com~uted between the independent variables and measures of strike activity. First-order partial correlations were also computed for these bivariate hypotheses using the designated set of control and moderator variables. Finally, two sets of multiple regression equations were derived, one set using all nine variables and another set just the most significant of the nine predictors.
Bivariate Analysis. Table 3 presents the zero-order correlations for the bivariate hypotheses. The results for two of the independent variables, race-poverty and local employee status, differ considerably from our original expectations. Although it was hypothesized to be positively related to the measures of strike activity, race-poverty is not significantly correlated with any of the four strike measures. I t seems probable that local employee strikes involving race have received an inordinate amount of attention and that these strikes inaccurately depict a pervasive source of strike activity. The local employee status factor is significantly related to only one measure of strike activity, but its association with strike duration is positive rather than negative. This result suggests that local employee status influences only the economic ability of local employees to hold out during a strike and that economic need or relative deprivation theses are inadequate in accounting for the willingness of local emplovees to strike. All four of the factors derived from the governmental sector variables exhibit relatively consistent, significant correlations with the relative frequency and volume of strikes, with fiscal effort and professionalism by far the most strongly correlated with these measures of strike activity. On the other hand, with the exception of private union influence, the macro-environmental and public employment factors tend to be significantly related only to strike duration. Partial Correlation Analysis. T o test for spurious relationships and to judge the effects of the moderator variables, first-order partial correlations were computed using the variables in Table 2 . None of the control variables intended to tap characteristics of the population of cities in each state reduced any of the correlations significantly from their original levels. State population, however, did reduce the correlations between urbanization-industrialization, past strike activity, and the raw frequency measure of strike activity.
Only two of the moderator variables significantly reduced the correlations between the independent and dependent variables. Table 4 presents the results for the relationships where the moderator variables substantially reduced the original correlations. Facilitation of collective bargaining moderated the relationships between property tax reliance and frequency, duration, and volume. The moderating affects of legal policy on property tax reliance and strikes might be expected to operate in a number of ways. Local jurisdictions operating under fully developed public sector collective bargaining statutes may be less susceptible to strikes arising from union and management's disagreement over ability to pay because of binding The first d c i m t *ported in each cell is the zeroorder cornlation coefficient and the second coefficient is the first-order partial correlation codcient.
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requirements of third-party procedures. State statutes for local employee bargaining frequently also provide some criteria upon which to judge a municipality's ability to pay. As a focus for the convergence of their expectations, these criteria may reduce the influence of property tax constraints on strike behavior. The unemployment rate also had a pronounced moderating influence on the relationships between property tax reliance and private union influence and several of the strike activity measures. These moderating relationships suggest that high unemployment within the local population may restrain public employee organizations from seeking wage increases that would possibly increase property tax levels, that the maintenance of job security may become a greater concern during periods of relatively high unemployment, and that public employee organizations might expect to receive support from the general union movement only during periods relatively favorable to the achievement of their own goals.
Multiple Regression Analysis. While the primary purpose of this study was to test some predictions concerning relationships of certain variables to measures of strike activity, simple bivariate tests give no indication of the relative importance of these variables or of how well these variables as a group predict strike activity.
The multiple regression analysis presented in Table 5 was used for this purpose. All nine predictor variables were regressed against each of the four dependent variables. A second set of regression equations were run using the best predictors, those variables that added significantly to changes in the multiple R, for each measure of strike activity.
Since our partial correlation analysis showed considerable reductions in the correlations between frequency and the independent variables when controlled for the natural log of state population, this variable was included as a control in the two regression equations for strike frequency. As shown in equations (1) and (2) of Table 5 , size is the best predictor of strike frequency. Results for relative frequency are a different matter as equations (3) and (4) in Table 5 show. The high multiple R (= .90) shows that the nine variables account for the major portion of variance (81 percent) in the relative frequency of work stoppages. Using only the three most important variables, private union influence, fiscal effort, and professionalism, almost no reduction occurs in the proportion of explained variance, indicating that the other six variables add only insignificantly to the prediction.
Equations (5) through (8) show the predictions for strike duration and volume, and though the multiple R' s are not as high, the variables nevertheless explain significant portions of the variance in the criterion measures. Approximately half of the variance in work stoppage volume is accounted for by urbanization-industrialization, private union influence, race-poverty, fiscal effort and property tax reliance.
Some caution is advisable in interpreting these multivariate results. Interaction effects, which in some cases may be significant, are not tested by the methodology. For instance, the differing signs for professionalism observed for the multivariate and bivariate analyses may be accounted for in part by interaction effects between fiscal effort and professionalism. Furthermore, we offer no test of the quality of the predictions. We d,id not, for example, gather measures from a sample of states nor from the same states for different time periods and attempt to predict the values of the criterion variables. The results of such predictions compared to actual values of the criterion variables would provide powerful tests of the "goodness" of our regression lines. Such tests will have to await further explication of relationships among the predictor variables and the availability of the requisite data.
Although this study does not provide a theory of strikes in local government. tve believe it does d e r several significant contributions. The results support the importance of several variables, particularly private union influence and fiscal effort, as factors in local government strikes. Our analyses of several moderating relationships also suggest that local government strikes are to some degree manipulable through public policy and subject to cyclical shifts in the unemployment rate. At a general level, our results are more tentative but suggest that local government strike activity is more predictable than Burton and Krider concluded from their previous analysis. Using dimensions of the environment, government sector, and public employment sector, we were able to account for a high proportion of the variance in the relative frequency of local government strikes and a smaller proportion of the variance in strike volume and duration. Duration is explained to some extent by system variables but the size of our R2 suggests that variables such as attributes of union and government leaders, negotiators, and the perceived essentiality of particular local government services might substantially enhance any explanation of local government strike duration.
I n assessing these results, it is important to note that our study was limited to an analysis of cross-sectional data aggregated by state. Cross-sectional studies are informative about relationships among variables but are not adequate for testing causality. Aggregation at the state level may mask variance whose source is other than interstate. In some cases state boundaries may be artificial delimitors of the operation of metropolitan or regional influences. Metropolitan influences may mean that localities are more under the influence of variables common to contiguous entities than variables aggregated by state. Regional effects may mean that in essence we have drawn from more than a single population, i.e., relationships obtained for Southern states might not he true for Northern states.
Our results do indicate some direction for future efforts in more formal theory building and empirical research. Private sector strikes in the United States have been explained using models of economic behavior. In recent cross-national investigations of industrial conflict, however, substantial support has been developed for organizational and political models of strike behavior rather than economic rnodel~."Snyder concludes from a recent study that the inconsistencies between these findings can be attributed to the political and legal context of labor relat i o n~.~? Given the significance of some variables that might be classified primarily as political (private union influence, professionalism) and others that may be classified as primarily economic (fiscal effort, property tax reliance), this analysis indicates the probable need for some convergence in the assumptions of each of these two models for developing an explanatory theory of local government strikes.
Two methodological strategies would appear to hold the greatest potential for future empirical research on local government strikes. Because of the unavailability of published data disaggregated by governmental level prior to 1972, this study was limited to cross-sectional analysis. As data become available over a longer period of time, it will be fruitful to conduct time-series analyses of local government strikes. Time-series are particularly appropriate for investigation of the influences of changes in variables over time, such as leLgal policy and the unemployment rate, and testing of causal hypotheses. Another approach would be to conduct studies of local government strikes employing disproportionate stratified samples of cities. This methodology would provide the opportunity for both qualitative and quantitative assessments of local government strike phenomena, including interactions between political system characteristics and organization, group, and individual variablm.
